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Abstract
Professor Janis has succeeded in offering a comprehensive and accessible treatise that un-
doubtedly will be used as a basic text in introductory courses on international law.
BOOK REVIEW
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Mark
W. Janis.* Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1988. xvi +
299 pp. ISBN 0-316-45763-9. US$15.95.
Reviewed by Peter Lake* *
In the tradition of the "classic" introductory treatise on
international law-J.L. Brierly's The Law of Nations'-Professor
Janis has succeeded in offering a comprehensive and accessible
treatise that undoubtedly will be used as a basic text in intro-
ductory courses on international law in U.S. law schools and as
a reference for non-lawyers (p. xv).2 ProfessorJanis has set out
to reflect international law-an exercise in what Bentham
called "expository jurisprudence" (p. 164),' with an explicit fo-
cus upon the international practice of the United States (p. xv).
This focus makes Professor Janis's effort particularly valuable
and useful to U.S. legal education, for which Brierly's classic is
less useful. The book is also more valuable because of the
treatment of the vast changes in international law since
Brierly's last edition in 1955. Professor Janis is too self-effac-
ing 4 in noting simply the "relative modernity" of the book in
comparison to Brierly's efforts (p. xv). The author draws at-
tention to, inter alia, the vast increase in private and commer-
cial international law, the concomitant erosion of the tradi-
tional distinction between public and private international law,
and emphasizes the growing importance of individuals as sub-
jects of international law and the growing field of international
human rights.
ProfessorJanis significantly modernizes his book in his ap-
• Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
•* Associate, Cahill Gordon & Reindel, New York, New York. A.B. 1981,
Harvard College; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School.
1. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1928).
2. Brierly's work has been influential in many fields. For example, John Rawls
has cited to and relied upon The Law of Nations in his sketch of an approach to ques-
tions of international justice. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 327 (1971).
3. SeeJ. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 293-94 (Burns & Hart eds. 1970) (1789).
4. This tendency is also evident from the fact that the book's index omits refer-
ence to works by Professor Janis cited therein.
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proach to basic jurisprudential questions and histori-
cal/jurisprudential developments. The reader is introduced to
the basic question of whether and to what extent international
law is law and to "international law's most famous jurispruden-
tial critic, John Austin," who regarded international "law" not
as positive law, but as law enforced by moral sanctions only (p.
2). In the context of discussing this issue, ProfessorJanis even
directs the reader to basic questions of semiotics and herme-
neutics-demonstrating his awareness of various trends in
modern international law jurisprudence (p. 3 n.12).5
Professor Janis also discusses international legal process
(pp. 6-8), which introduces the reader to the international as-
pects of perhaps the most prominent variant of legal realism in
the United States-the legal process school. Indeed, as in the
tradition of that school, Professor Janis deals at great length
with international legal institutions, procedures, and actions.
Another example of Professor Janis's attention to historical ju-
risprudential issues is his treatment of the public/private dis-
tinction and Jeremy Bentham.6 ProfessorJanis mounts a solid
and convincing attack on that distinction and Bentham's expo-
sition of it with a combination of historical and jurisprudential
arguments. This particular maneuver-the partial rejection of
the public/private distinction as fundamental to international
law-distinguishes the book and makes it a progressive and
particularly modern introductory text.
At times, however, the focus on the international practice
of the United States works against the modernity of the ap-
proach and leaves it vulnerable to attack in the coming decades
as a "reflection" of international law. The book, with its inter-
national legal process orientation, shares a common orienta-
tion with Brierly-a basic Austinian fascination with a positive
law sovereign coupled with a post-war realist emphasis on pro-
cess and efficacy of process. There is a tendency to focus upon
.the most powerful sovereign or sovereigns in the international
5. For an example of such a modern work, see D. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987) (discussing trends in international jurisprudence). See also
Falk, Book Review, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1065 (1988) (reviewing favorably Kennedy's
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES).
6. For a more detailed treatment of Bentham's international law writings, see
Janis, Jeremy Benthain and the Fashioning of "International Law," 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405
(1984).
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system and to identify the content and process of international
law with the norms and processes that are or have been put
forward by that or those sovereigns. In some ways the book
fortifies the image, so clear in Brierly, that international law is
primarily the international law of and among developed coun-
tries, principally Europe and the United States, and the institu-
tions, treaties, and norms that they have created.
Thus, in Chapter 1, we are given an account of the history
of international law that is entirely a history of the develop-
ment of law among European and Mediterranean nations. The
various discussions of international institutions throughout the
book focus largely on institutions formed by the initiative of
the United States and/or European countries. The discussion
of treaties focuses largely on treaties among and between de-
veloped countries and the impact of those treaties upon devel-
oped countries.
One area of concern where this is particularly notable is in
Chapter 7, where Professor Janis treats the growth of the law
of international human rights since World War II. Treatment
of human rights law, focusing upon legal process and the effi-
cacy of legal process, is broken into three parts: the Nurem-
berg trial and the resultant United Nations declarations and
conventions, European Human Rights Law, and Inter-Ameri-
can Human Rights Law. As Professor Janis, echoing a Ben-
tham-like position that rights without remedies ate nonsense
on stilts, states: "The central problem [of the law of interna-
tional human rights] has become not so much finding a univer-
sal law of human rights (most agree that one now exists), but
enforcing that law.... The larger and more troubling question
is what can be done in terms of international legal process" (p.
177). It is in this vein that ProfessorJanis gives particular at-
tention to the European Court of Human Rights, with binding
legal authority, and particularly to the Sunday Times case,7
which he regards ,as one of the "important landmarks in the
development of international law" (p. 192).8
7. Judgment of 26 April,. 1979, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B), No. 30.
8. Professor Janis notes that decisions such as Sunday Times "show international
law at its most potent, giving individuals effective international remedies even against
their own states and even in close cases" (p. 192).
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Professor Janis regards international human rights law as
much less developed outside of Western Europe:
It would be an attractive prospect to contemplate Euro-
pean human rights law as a model for other regions of the
world. The real vision, however, is otherwise. Outside of
Western Europe, though the declared international laws of
human rights are many, there has been only a little luck in
establishing effective international human rights legal ma-
chinery (p. 192).
Thus, the book's only consideration of regional human rights
law outside of Western Europe is of Inter-American human
rights law, which, sharing similar features with its European
counterpart (pp. 192-97),' Professor Janis regards as "It]he
most developed form of international human rights law other
than European human rights law . . ." (p. 192).
The emphasis on Anglo-American and European human
rights carries with it a particular emphasis on civil and political
rights as quintessential human rights. Thus, although Profes-
sorJanis never defines human rights nor attempts an enumera-
tion of them, it is clear that they are, in the large part, familiar
"bill of rights" types of rights. Thus, as ProfessorJanis points
out, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' ° arising out
of fundamental concerns with respect to the Nuremberg trial
(p. 176), sets forth many rights, for example, to "life, liberty
and the security of person," to "equal protection of the law,"
to fair trials, to "own property," and to "freedom of thought,
conscience and religion" (pp. 176-77). The European Human
Rights Convention and its subsequently adopted protocols"
list the following among the substantial rights:
the 'right to life,' the right not to 'be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' the
'right to liberty and security of person,' the 'right to a fair
9. See Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 361 (1989) (comparing judicial review and evidentiary matters of Inter-
American Court of Human Rights with International Court ofJustice, and European
Court of Human Rights, and European Court of Justici); see also Note, The American
Convention on Human Rights: Toward Uniform Interpretation of Human Rights Law, 6 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 610 (1983) (exploring sources of law available to Inter-American
Court and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
10. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at'71 (1948).
11. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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and public hearing' in civil and criminal adjudications, the
right to be free from the application of ex post facto laws, the
right to respect for 'private and family life,' the 'right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion,' the right 'to
freedom of expression,' the 'right to freedom and peaceful
assembly,' the 'right to marry and to found a family,' and,
for all but three of the Convention's parties (Liechtenstein,
Spain, and Switzerland), the right to the 'peaceful enjoy-
ment' of 'possessions' and the 'right to education' (p.
181). 12
Although the book gives substantial attention, in volume
and detail, to international human rights, it does not introduce
the reader to competing conceptions of human rights-such as
rights to development-that many countries regard as funda-
mental human rights. The reader is not introduced to hotly de-
bated questions of which rights are truly fundamental human
rights, which rights have priority, and to the problems associ-
ated with treating Anglo-American civil liberties as the first or-
der human rights. At the more fundamental level, crucial to
the emerging vision of individuals as subjects of international
law and to questions of state sovereignty, the mounting force
of cultural-relativist attacks, led by Elvin Hatch,'13 on universal
rights is not addressed. A more modern introduction to inter-
national law, particularly the law of international human rights,
would reflect the fact that much of the world views the funda-
mental freedoms as particular creations of the Enlightenment
and as culture-specific to Western culture-particularly Anglo-
American dominated culture. For nations with different priori-
ties and different levels of economic and social development,
the enunciation of these freedoms may be in derogation of
rights that have higher priority. The imposition of these rights
would appear to be part of a larger problem of imperialism and
colonialism of the Anglo-European powers. Indeed, there is
support even within the Anglo-American tradition for the
proposition that many civil and political rights regarded as fun-
damental human rights are priority rights only when a certain
level of economic and social development has taken place. 4
12. Id. arts. 2-12.
13. See E. HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY (1983) (positing various approaches
to universal rights).
14. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 2. This assumption is implicit in Rawls's division of
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Such problems are not sterile or academic. In fact, the
major stumbling block to workable universal human rights may
be that our conceptions of human rights are not properly pack-
aged for export. Major advances in international human rights
in the next decade are possible if this problem is recognized
and addressed. Unfortunately, at least with respect to interna-
tional human rights, Professor Janis has posited that most
agree that a universal law of human rights exists and, there-
fore, concludes that the central problem of international
human rights is enforcement. That posit is faulty; there is sub-
stantial disagreement over which human rights are truly
human rights, even among. those who agree in principle to
universality. The author's position accurately reflects a U.S.
perspective on international law. However, this underscores
the problem with "reflecting" international law from a U.S.
perspective, which Professor Janis does (as Brierly did from a
British perspective) with great accuracy.
social primary goods and is made explicit elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 60-63, 150-52,
542-43.
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